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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A. The Court Erred in Concluding the Statements Were Voluntarily Made
In determining whether a defendant's will was overborne in a particular case, this Court
reviews the totality of all the surrounding circumstances, including "the characteristics of the
accused and the details of the interrogation[.]" State v. Cordova, 137 Idaho 635, 638, 51 P.3d
449,452 (Ct. App. 2002). The Court not only considers the factual circumstances surrounding
the confession, but also assesses the psychological impact on the accused and then evaluates the
legal significance of how the accused reacted. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,226
(1973).
1. The police overreaching by itself requires suppression
While the state argues otherwise, the interrogation tactics used by the police constituted
coercive police activity under Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).

(aJ The officers made implied promises of leniency.
There is no doubt that the promise of leniency is a form of governmental misconduct.
The Supreme Court held in a post -Colorado v. Connelly case that implied promises of leniency
are a factor to be considered under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Radford, 134 Idaho
187, 192,998 P.2d 80, 85 (2000). The Court of Appeals has noted that "[i]fthe defendant's free
will is undermined by threats or through direct or implied promises, then a statement cannot be
considered voluntary and is inadmissible." State v. Wilson, 126 Idaho 926, 929, 894 P.2d 159,
162 (Ct. App. 1995).
As stated in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897), "a confession, in order
to be admissible, must be free and voluntary; that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats

or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion
of any improper influence[.]" While Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991), replaced
the Bram test with the current totality of the circumstances test, Bram still establishes that direct
or implied promises of leniency are the type of coercive police misconduct required by Colorado
v. Connelly. "If the defendant's free will is undermined by threats or through direct or implied
promises, then the statement is not voluntary and is inadmissible." State v. Valero, -

Idaho - ,

285 P.3d 1014, 1016 (Ct. App. 2012).
It is not required that the police make an express promise of leniency. Nor does it matter

that the police officer cannot personally make good on the implied promise. In fact, it aggravates
the misconduct ifthat is the case because the police officer is implying that he can do something
the law does not permit him to do. As the Court of Appeals recently said,
while the detective may have made no direct promises, by virtue of the themes
developed and tactics used by the detective, how "telling the truth would be
better" than lying certainly implicated matters outside of the detective's control. ..
. By suggesting that the court would want to know why Valero committed the acts
charged, and that it was very important to be able to tell the court that Valero was
not a molester, rapist, or sexual deviant, the detective implied that telling the truth
could result in favorable treatment by the court, again something he could not
deliver. Most critically, the detective's representation that Valero could be
charged with a more serious crime of lying to police if he did not confess was
inherently coercive. It is precisely the type of coercive tactic that could induce an
innocent person to confess.
State v. Valero, 285 P.3d at 1019-20.

Thus, it does not matter that Detective McCormick told Mr. Stone that the judge was "the
decision maker" because the detective also stated that "he had the power to make
recommendations and I've got the power to keep people safe." Exhibit 2, pg. 250, In. 24 - pg.
251, In. 2. (The detective's implied promise to keep Mr. Stone safe was particularly powerful
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given Mr. Stone's strong fear of being sexually assaulted in jail. It is worth noting that Mr. Stone
did not change his statement to fit the theory expressed by the detective until he realized that the
detective "didn't believe [him] and never will," and that he was faced with "going to jail for the
rest of [his] life" where he would be sexually assaulted "every night." Id., pg. 254, In. 7-8; pg.
255, In. 16-18; pg. 257, In 4-5.) Further the detective implied that his recommendation carried
weight with the court, but that Mr. Stone had to come around to the detective's version of the
events if he was to get that favorable recommendation. (McCormick: "I had every intention of
doing - honoring what I told you 1 but once you started lying to me about this stuff, you know, all
bets are off. I can't." Exhibit 2, pg. 247, In. 17-20.
Here, like Valero, the police told Mr. Stone that telling the truth would be better than
lying and suggested that the judge would treat the truth-teller better. ("Who do you think the
judge is going to be more lenient, going to be more - going to want to work with more, okay?"
Exhibit 2, pg. 276, In. 21 - pg. 277, In 4. "From my experience, someone who wants to bullshit
the system versus someone who takes accountability, there seems to be some disparity between
the sentence, okay? Judges aren't stupid[.]" !d., pg. 294, In. 12-16.) Mr. Stone knew that "the
truth," in the detective's view, was that he did not act in self-defense. The detective also told Mr.
Stone that it was very important that Mr. Stone admit that he didn't act in self-defense ("[W]hat
separates a man from a boy ... [is] the ability to man up and not make excuses, make lies, blame
everyone else on what happened."), but instead to admit that he killed his wife due to her
provocation. ("You know, some things happen in the heat of passion, some things happen that

What the detective will no longer "honor" are his previous assurances that he wasn't
"trying to crucify" Mr. Stone and that he was "trying to give [Mr. Stone] an out." Exhibit 2 pg.
233, In. 7; pg. 231, In. 20-21.
1
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just put great people - good people like you and me over the edge .... It happens day in and out.
... But the difference is what separates a good person from a street thug is the ability to say, 'Oh
my God. I lost it for a second. '" Id, pg. 257, In 7-23.) See also Slale v. J\1onlero, 191 P.3d 828,
832 (Utah App. 2008) (An interrogation can be impermissibly coercive when it includes a threat
of greater punishment or a promise for lesser punishment depending on whether the suspect
confessed.). And while the police did not threaten Mr. Stone with "lying to police," as they did
in Valero, they did tell him that lying to the police was worse than murder. (Stone: "What's
worse than murder?" McCormick: "A liar by far." Id, pg. 257, In. 15-16.)
In short, there were implied promises of leniency offered to Mr. Stone which were
conditioned on him adopting the detective's alternative version of the events. Thus, Mr. Stone
established there was police overreaching under Colorado v. Connelly. But even if those implied
promises of leniency were not enough to constitute police overreaching, they were part of a
combination of other interrogation tactics which cumulatively were misconduct.
(b) The police used the "falsefriend" technique

First, the state implies that Mr. Stone is misleading the Court when he attributes the
statement "our main concern now is your well being internally" to a law enforcement officer.
State's Brief, pg. 21 C ... assuming the relevant unidentified speaker was actually a law
enforcement officer"). However, the state stipulated below that it was Detective Frank
Hernandez who made that statement. After the close of evidence, the trial court ordered the
parties "to supply the Court with indications as to whom the unidentified speakers were in
Volume I (State's exhibit #1) and Volume II (State's exhibit #2.)" R 99. The parties did so and
the copies of Exhibits 1 and 2 which contain the indications are attached to the PSI. This copy
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has the speaker quoted above identified as "F[rank] H[ernandez]." Exhibit 1, pg. 28, 19-21.)
Next the state expressed wonder over how a statement "which reflects concern for
Stone's injury can be considered a coercive tactic," State's Brief, pg. 21, but it is clear that the
false friend technique can be coercive. As explained by the Utah Supreme Court:
Rettenberger's interrogation took place in yet a larger context of deception. The
interrogating officers made extensive use .of the so-called "false friend" technique,
whereby they represented to Rettenberger that they were his friends and that they
were acting in his best interest. See Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal
Procedure § 6.2 (2d ed.1992). This technique is commonly used in police
interrogations because "resistence to the disclosure of information is considerably
increased ... if something is not done to establish a friendly and trusting attitude
on the part of the subject." Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing
Corifessions, 127 U. Pa. L.Rev. 581, 614 (1979) (quoting Robert F. Royal &
Stephen R. Schutt, The Gentle Art of Interviewing and Interrogation: A
Professional Manual and Guide (1976)).
In this atmosphere ... the suspect is fooled into trusting that the
interrogator's behavior will conform to the norms of friendship: the
interrogator will loyally help the suspect out of the jam, advise the
suspect to confess only if confession will be beneficial [to the
suspect], and so on. Margaret L. Paris, Faults, Fallacies, and the
Future of Our Criminal Justice System: Trust, Lies, and
Interrogation,3 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 3,21-22 (1995).

~ 26 Obviously, the false friend strategy bears no resemblance to abusive
coercion of the "third-degree" variety. This does not mean that the false friend
technique cannot, in some circumstances, be coercive. Indeed, the false friend
technique may be ideally suited to extract an involuntary confession from certain
types of suspects who, like Rettenberger, have below-average cognitive abilities,
A.D.D., and Dependent Personality Disorder, making them overly compliant,
submissive, and anxious to receive reassurance and approval from other people.

~

28 We do not hold that the use of the false friend technique in police
interrogations is, standing alone, sufficiently coercive to produce an involuntary
confession. The significance of the stratagem comes in relation to other tactics and
factors. The false friend stratagem provides an environment in which other
5

interrogation tactics may become coercive. To the extent that Rettenberger suffers
from mental disabilities and deficiencies, and to the extent that he believed the
officers were protecting his best interests, he was less likely to question the false
claims about the evidence against him; was less likely to clearly invoke his right
to counselor to remain silent; was more likely to "parrot" back the details the
officers suggested, whether or not they were true; was more likely to place stock
in any promises or threats that the officers made, however ambiguous they might
be; and was more likely to confess, whether guilty or innocent.

State v. Rettenberger, .984 P.2d 1009, 1016-17 (Utah 1999). In this case, like in Rettenberger's,
Mr. Stone suffered from mental deficiencies, as described by Dr. Beaver in the portion of his
testimony which was not considered by the court. Thus, in this case, the false friend technique
was one of the several coercive interrogation techniques employed by the police.
Finally, the state argues that the detective's statement that he was going to conduct a
"very thorough investigation" does not show an effort to try and falsely befriend Mr. Stone.
However, the important part of that statement is that the purpose of the investigation is "to
protect [Mr. Stone] just as much as protect her[.]" Exhibit 2, pg. 142, In. 23-24. By casting
himself in the role of protector, instead of accuser, the detective falsely acted as a friend to Mr.
Stone, especially when considered in the context of the entire interrogation. See Opening Brief,
pg. 26-27 for additional examples.

(c) The police used minimization techniques
Finally, the state does not seriously contend that the detective did not use minimization
techniques during the interrogation. Instead, it first cites to Sher[fJWashoe County v. Bessey, 914
P.3d 618 (Nev. 1996), as authority that such techniques are not improper. However, the holding
in the case is that "[t]he district court erred in granting pretrial habeas relief because habeas may
not be used to challenge admissibility of evidence on constitutional grounds." 914 P.3d at 619.
Thus, the statement relied upon by the state is mere dicta as it was extraneous to the holding.
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Further, the portion of the opinion relied upon by the state was only joined by two of the five
justices of the Court. A third justice only concurred in the result and two dissented. Finally, the
police did not even use minimization techniques in that case. The defendant argued that his
statements should be suppressed because the police lied to him about the existence of an
inculpatory crime lab report. ("Even if Bessey had filed a proper motion to suppress, his
inculpatory statements should not have been suppressed. Bessey contended that his inculpatory
statements were made after the police officer showed Bessey a fabricated document implicating
him as the perpetrator of a sexual assault on a minor." Id.) So, the portion of the opinion relied
upon by the state is mere dicta about a hypothetical situation found in a plurality opinion.
Plainly, the persuasive effect of that statement is nil.
Second, the state cites to State v. Wilson, supra, but that case was distinguished in Valero
as follows:
However, we did not hold [in Wilson] that those claimed circumstances could not
result in involuntariness, relying instead upon the findings by the district court in
that case:
The district court, considering the totality of the circumstances,
concluded that Wilson understood the nature of the rights being
read to him and realized the seriousness of the events at the time.
There was also evidence from which the district court could have
found that [the lieutenant's] statements to Wilson were not
sufficient to undermine Wilson's free will. These findings are
supported by the evidence in the record and are not clearly
erroneous.
Id. at 929, 894 P .2d at 162. Thus, we did not hold that downplaying the
seriousness of the crime was insufficient to support a finding of involuntariness,
but that the suspect in that case knew the seriousness of the crimes. Id. While we
do not hold that downplaying the seriousness of the accusations, by itself, resulted
in Valero's will being overborne, it is a factor in the totality of the circumstances.
State v. Valero, 285 P.3d at 1019; accord Beltz v. State, 980 P.2d 474, 478 (Alaska App. 1999)
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(In a case where the trial court found the defendant's testimony that the police had used
minimization techniques to be "highly suspect" and apparently "contrived ... to satisfY the test
for involuntariness," the appellate court still noted that such interview techniques are to be
considered under the totality of the circumstances.)

(d) Conclusion
The evidence of the implied promises of leniency was sufficient by itself or in
combination with the other interrogation techniques to show both police overreaching and that
the confession was involuntary. Thus, the state did not carry its burden of proving Mr. Stone's
statements were voluntary. In addition, as is set forth below, the proof of involuntariness
becomes even stronger when the Court considers the rest of the circumstances surrounding Mr.
Stone's statements.
2. The totality of the circumstances also requires suppression

(a) Whether Miranda warnings were given
While the police gave Miranda warnings, the Court should also take into consideration
when looking at the totality of the circumstances that the police minimized the importance of the
warnings. The state's citations to Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) and State v. Doe, 137
Idaho 519, 50 P.3d 1014 (2002), are not apposite because neither are cases where the
voluntariness of the confession was challenged. In Siebert, the question was whether a
"midstream recitation" of Miranda warnings after the police had already interrogated and
obtained an unwarned confession would render any post-warning statements admissible. (The
Court held it would not.) 542 U.S. at 604. In Doe the juvenile argued that he did not voluntarily
waive his Miranda rights. The question of what effect the downplaying of Miranda rights would

8

have on the voluntariness of a confession obtained by the use of coercive interrogation
techniques was neither presented nor discussed in that case.
(b) The youth of the accused

As has been noted, Mr. Stone was 49 years old at the time of the interrogation. T pg. 399,
In. 12. However, one of the reasons age is considered is that it is presumed that older individuals
have had more relevant experiences than younger individuals, but that is not the case here. As
Mr. Stone put it, "I've never been

I'm 49 years old. I've never been arrested in my life."

Exhibit 1, pg. 3, In. 23-4. Thus, the fact that Mr. Stone was 49 is a neutral fact given that he had
never had any contact with law enforcement.
The state seeks to minimize the effect of this lack of experience by pointing out that Mr.
Stone also said he "had read up on the law a lot." State's Brief, pg. 28, quoting Exhibit 1, pg. 58,
In. 4. However, what Mr. Stone means by that is he is familiar with gun law. This is clear from
his immediately preceding comment that "1 have a concealed weapons permit. I know that
doesn't give me the right to go around and shoot people." Exhibit 1, pg. 57, In. 25 - pg. 58, In. 2.
His statement does not mean, as the state suggests, that he had read up on police interrogation
practice and procedures. And while Mr. Stone told Detective Hernandez that he found shows
like The First 48 "fascinating," Exhibit 2, pg. 245, there is nothing in the appellate record
showing what such shows are like. In any case, it seems unlikely that a popular television show
alerted Mr. Stone to use of the subtle and sophisticated interrogation techniques employed
against him.
In addition, the trial court did not consider relevant testimony from Dr. Beaver touching
on this factor. In particular, Mr. Stone is highly suggestible by comparison to an average person.
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T pg. 169, In. 14-17. He is socially anxious, has few close friends, is very attached to his parents,
has difficulty with crowds, and struggles with depression. T pg. 170, In. 6-25. Dr. Beaver
testified that persons who are socially anxious are more likely to want to please people in
authority, T pg. 178, In. 1-2, while being less able to maintain their "thinking integrity" while
under stress. id., at In. 4-11. Also, ignored by the court was the fact that Mr. Stone had recently
been hospitalized for psychiatric problems. ld., at pp. 170, In 25 - pg. 171, In. 1.
So while the evidence showed a chronological age of 49, Mr. Stone's emotional age was
lower and militates against a finding of voluntariness.

(c) The accused's level of education or low intelligence
The same lack of experience with law enforcement makes the fact that Mr. Stone has a
master's degree in speech pathology a neutral one.

(d) The length of the detention
Mr. Stone's detention started sometime after 6:00 p.m. He was arrested at 2:15 a.m. and
taken to the Ada County Jail where he called his mother at 3:55 a.m. Exhibit 2, pg. 307, In. 4;
Exhibit C, pg. 2, In. 10.
The state argues that the length of the detention was caused by medical treatment and thus
cannot be police overreaching. State's Brief, pg. 17. However, the transcripts show that Mr.
Stone's hospital stay was extended due to the ongoing police interrogation. Further, he was not
receiving active medical care for most of the time he was there. In fact, the last time Mr. Stone
speaks with a medical professional is at pg. 167 of Exhibit 2, but the transcript does not end until
pg.3lO. (Although denied by the state, the length of the transcripts of the interviews is important
because it illustrates the extremely long time that the interrogation went on.) Importantly,
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Detective McCormick testified that Mr. Stone was discharged from the hospital at 11 :45 p.m.,
but he kept interrogating Mr. Stone until 2:15 a.m. T pg. 299, In. 24 - pg. 300, In. 4.
Although the length of the detention was a result of police overreaching in this case, not
every factor considered in the totality of the circumstances has to be an example of police
overreaching. Obviously, the police have no control over the suspect's age, his level of
education or his intelligence, yet the Court must take all those factors into account. For another
example, the fact that Mr. Stone was detained at gunpoint is a relevant factor whether or not the
police were wholly justified in pulling weapons. (The use of weapons, justified or not, is a show
of power and authority by the police over the suspect and thus can lead to a coercive
atmosphere.) Here, the length of detention is a factor which weighs against a finding of
voluntariness.

(e) The repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning
Here, Mr. Stone was questioned from the time he was confronted at the house until he
was arrested some eight hours later with only short interruptions for medical treatment. This is
obviously a long period of questioning and weighs against a finding ofvoluntariness. The state's
citation to Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990), is not apposite. The Court in Perkins held
"that an undercover law enforcement officer posing as a fellow inmate need not give Miranda
warnings to an incarcerated suspect before asking questions that may elicit an incriminating
response." 496 U.S. at 300. The rationale behind this ruling was that "[w]hen the suspect has no
reason to think that the listeners have official power over him, it should not be assumed that his
words are motivated by the reaction he expects from his listeners." Id, at 297. Mr. Stone was
well-aware that his interrogators were anned police officers. Consequently, Perkins sheds no
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light on the question here.

(f) Deprivation offood or sleep
As shown by the transcript, Mr. Stone did not eat nor did he sleep during the entire time
from when the police arrived at his home to the end of the interview at 2: 15 a.m. Whether he
was deprived in the sense that the police prevented him from obtaining food during the
interrogation is unknown. However, the record shows that the police kept interrogating Mr.
Stone from the time they first detained him at gunpoint until they formally arrested him,
excepting short breaks for medical treatment, thus preventing him from eating and sleeping by
keeping him occupied the entire time.

(g) Other factors
In addition to the Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973), factors above,
these other factors also show a lack of voluntariness.
First, Mr. Stone requested, but was not allowed, to use the bathroom. Exhibit 2, pg. 161,
In. 3-12. The state notes that "while the hospital staff may have restricted Stone's ability to use
the bathroom ... their actions do not translate into a finding of police overreaching." State's
Brief, pg. 20. Left unsaid by the state is the obvious fact that non-state action can be considered
as part of the totality of circumstances. The facts that Mr. Stone was in discomfort from not
being able to relieve himself and in pain from the knife wound are relevant even though the
police were not the cause of Mr. Stone's pain and discomfort. In addition, it appears that the
police exploited the situation as the transcript does not show them making any effort to alert
medical staff to Mr. Stone's distress. Finally, as it is unlikely that there was a medical
justification for preventing Mr. Stone to relieve himself, the delay in allowing him to go to the

12

bathroom was likely influenced by hospital staff not wanting to interrupt the police interrogation.
The police also refused Mr. Stone's request to meet with his father. Detective
McCormick admitted that Mr. Stone wanted his father to be with him but that the detective
refused to allow that. T pg. 308, In. 8-22. Mr. Stone's father testified he asked to see his son, but
was not allowed to do so. T pg. 203, In. 9 - pg. 204, In. 7. The police also refused the
opportunity to use his cell phone, with which he might have contacted his parents. Exhibit 1, pg.
] 5, In. 8-9. Exhibit 2, pg. 157, In. 5-6. Mr. Stone also said that he wanted to call his pastor.
Exhibit], pg. 53, In. 14-16.
To this, the state argues that "there is no constitutional mandate requiring officers to
allow an individual to use a phone whenever he feels like it." State's Brief, pg. 18. But that is
too glib a response because the question is not whether Mr. Stone was deprived of a right to use
the phone, but rather did the police tactic of isolating him from his family and pastor contributed
to a coercive atmosphere. Plainly, it did and that factor also weighs against a finding of
voluntariness.
B. The Court Erred by Declining to Consider the Entire Testimony of Dr. Beaver
The state's only response to Mr. Stone's argument in this regard is that it need not be
reached since there was no showing of police overreaching under Colorado v. Connelly. State's
Brief, pg. 25, ft. 5. Mr. Stone has already refuted that argument above. Mr. Stone's argument
about why Dr. Beaver's testimony should have been considered by the Court in its entirety is set
forth at pages 14-18 of his Opening Brief.
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III. CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse the order denying the motion to suppress because the state
failed to meet its burden that the statements were made voluntarily. To the contrary, Mr. Stone
proved that the statements were involuntarily made. Alternatively, the Court should vacate the
order because the district court declined to consider all of Dr. Beaver's testimony. In either case,
the order should be reversed or remanded and the case remanded and Mr. Stone should be
permitted to withdraw his conditional guilty plea.
Respectfully submitted this

l ~ay of January, 2013.
~~t.~~
Dennis Benjamin
\
Attorney for Chris Stone
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this)L{td\y of January, 2013, I caused two true and correct
copies ofthe foregoing to be mailed to: Jessica Lorello, Office of the Attorney General, P.O. Box
83720, Boise, ID 83720-0010.
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